


HOOVER INSTITUTION ARCHIVES

Archival Media

MILLARD P. GOODFELLOW

BOX NO. 4

ACCESSION NO. 69085-8.37



Box 4
Folder 1

4-1
GOODFELLOW

SUBJECT FILE

110 p.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MEMORANDA
1941-1942

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES

MEMORANDA
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES

MEMORANDA

APRIL-1942 - MAY 1942

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICE

MEMORANDA DEC.

AUGUST 1942

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
SERVICES

MEMORANDA
JUNE-JULY 1942

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICE

MEMORANDUM
AUGUST 1942 - DEC. 1942

M.P. GOODFELLOW

SUBJECT FILE

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MEMORANDUM
1943-1944

26p

December 29, 1943

Mr. D. J. Leland, Office of
Special Funds, OSS

Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

Major I. A. Tolstoy Accounting

December 28th, 1943

Subject: - Commendation. ^{are in keeping with}

To: - ^{between Major Tolstoy,} Captain Brooke Dolan

From: - ^{OSS} Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

Now that you are leaving OSS for other duties I want to take this occasion to tell you that the contribution you have made to our war effort has been very substantial. It is not possible, because of the nature of the assignment, to outline in detail how important are the reports and new information you accumulated during the months of your arduous trip.

If ever the time should arrive when it would be helpful to discuss more fully with qualified officers your work, I shall be happy to do so.

M. Preston Goodfellow
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director

Mr. D. M. Dimond, Office of
Special Funds, OSS

Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

Major I. A. Tolstoy Accounting

Sept. 1, 1943
December 29, 1943

Attached are copies of the Tolstoy
Reports. These accounts are in keeping with
the arrangements made between Major Tolstoy,
Captain Dolan and the OSS on Goodfellow

M. Preston Goodfellow
Colonel, AUS
Deputy Director

D

Captain Ward P. Davis

Sept. 1, 1943

Captain Carl J. Hoffman

Colonel M. P. Goodfellow

Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

Tolstoy Reports

Tolstoy Reports

Attached are copies of the Tolstoy reports.

Attached are copies of the Tolstoy
Reports which I promised to send you.

M. Preston Goodfellow

Date Feb 2, 1943

Captain Carl O. Hoffman

September 1, 1943

Colonel M. Preston Goodfellow

Tolstoy Reports

Attached are copies of the Tolstoy reports.

M. Preston Goodfellow

Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

Date Feb 2, 1943

To: Col Goodfellow

February 2, 1943

Stanton
Gruder

Edson
Well
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Vanderbilt
Goodfellow ✓
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Richards

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JECTIVES TO OSS

quest of Colonel Donovan, I
ewith for your suggestions
lar memorandum, dated

January 20, 1943, received by Colonel Donovan from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and copy No. 10 of 13
of J.C.S. 202/1/D.


Encs.

O. C. D., Jr.



[Handwritten signature]
Office of the Secretariat

(9139)



February 2, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: Colonel Buxton
General Magruder
Dr. Rogers
Mr. Langer
Mr. Shepardson
Mr. Halliwell
Colonel Lowman
Dr. Baker
Commander Vanderbilt
Colonel Goodfellow ✓
Mr. Oechsner
Colonel Richards

FROM: Captain Doering

SUBJECT: J.C.S. DIRECTIVES TO OSS

At the request of Colonel Donovan, I am transmitting to you herewith for your suggestions and comments copy of circular memorandum, dated January 20, 1943, received by Colonel Donovan from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and copy No. 10 of 13 of J.C.S. 202/1/D.

Encs.

O. C. D., Jr.



COPY

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED FEB 24 1977
(see back of document) date

April 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, OPERATIONS
DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF:
AIDE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. FLEET:
DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services.

Enclosure: J.C.S. 155/7/D (Copy No. 40).

Enclosed herewith for appropriate action of addressees is the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive regarding the functions of the Office of Strategic Services as approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff. This supersedes the directive in J.C.S. 155/4/D.

Forrest B. Royal

FORREST B. ROYAL,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.



(13413)

*Signal Receipt for this
m. p. b.*

COPY

OSS OFFICE COPY # 9 of 15
not to be removed from OSS HDQ, Washington.

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COPY NO. 40 3

J.C.S. 155/7/D

DECLASSIFIED FEB 24 1977
(back of document) date

April 4, 1943

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a new directive for the Office of Strategic Services, has been approved by the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff and supersedes the directive in J.C.S. 155/4/D.

This new directive was made necessary by the recent Executive Order (see J.C.S. 224/1) transferring all propaganda functions to the Office of War Information.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.



M.F. COOPER FELLOW

SUBJECT FILE

MEMORANDUM
1943-1944

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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

ENCLOSURE

DIRECTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

AUTHORITY

1. By Military Order dated June 13, 1942, as amended by Executive Order March 9, 1943, the Office of Strategic Services was established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DEFINITION

2. As used in this directive, psychological warfare includes all measures, except propaganda, taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by means other than military action, as may be applied in support of actual or planned military operations.

FUNCTIONS

3. The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged in general with:

(a) The planning, development, coordination, and execution of the military program for psychological warfare. The economic warfare phases included in any plan for psychological warfare will be limited to recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the results desired.

(b) The compilation of such political, psychological, sociological, and economic information as may be required for military operations.

(c) The jurisdiction of the Office of Strategic Services in relation to the above shall not extend to or include the Western Hemisphere.



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(see back of document) date

SPECIFIC DUTIES

4. The following duties are specifically assigned to the Office of Strategic Services:

(a) In consultation with the War and Navy Departments and interested United States Government agencies, the initiation, formulation, and development of plans for psychological warfare in furtherance of actual or planned military operations.

(b) In cooperation with the War and Navy Departments and interested United States Government agencies, the development of psychological warfare doctrine.

(c) The progressive and orderly development of operating procedure and the characteristics of special weapons and special equipment for special operations not assigned or pertinent to other United States Government agencies. The characteristics having been so established, will be presented to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff, and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for transmittal to the appropriate supply service for development.

(d) The organization, equipment, and training of such individuals or organizations as may be required for special operations not assigned to other Government agencies.

(e) The conduct of special operations not assigned to other Government agencies or under the direct control of Theater or Area Commanders.

(f) The maintenance of liaison with all other Government agencies engaged in psychological warfare activities.

(g) The collection, evaluation, and dissemination of information required for the execution of psychological warfare.



M.P. GOODFELLOW

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1943-1844

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(see back of document) date

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(h) The preparation of Population and Social Conditions, Political, and Economic Sections of Strategic Surveys, together with such maps, charts, and appendices as may be required to accompany these sections. In addition, the preparation of such maps, charts, and illustrations as may be requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War and Navy Departments.

ECONOMIC WARFARE

5. Economic warfare operations included within the military program for psychological warfare will be planned and executed by the Board of Economic Warfare upon request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such requests will indicate the results desired and ask for reports of progress from the Board of Economic Warfare.

CONTROL BY THEATER COMMANDERS

6. Psychological warfare operations within organized theaters or areas are subject to direct control by the commander concerned. Within organized theaters or areas, officers and agents of the Office of Strategic Services will be under the direct control of the commander concerned, who will be informed of all plans or projects to be carried out within the theater or area, and their current status. They will not engage in any activity which has not been approved by the commander concerned.

CONDUCT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FUNCTIONS

7. Psychological warfare functions assigned to the Office of Strategic Services will be conducted in strict accordance with the following:

(a) The military program for psychological warfare is restricted to operations conducted in direct support of actual or planned military operations and includes the following:



M.P. GOODFELLOW

1943-1944

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(1) Economic warfare under the Board of Economic Warfare.

(2) Special operations under the Office of Strategic Services.

a. Sabotage.

b. Espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.

c. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare. Personnel to be provided for guerrilla warfare will be limited to organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of guerrilla units.

d. Counter-espionage in enemy-occupied or controlled territory.

e. Contact with underground groups in enemy-occupied territory.

f. Contact with foreign nationality groups in the United States to aid in the collection of essential information for the execution of psychological warfare operations in consultation with the State Department.

(3) Intelligence functions of the Office of Strategic Services are restricted to those necessary for the planning and execution of the military program for psychological warfare, and for the preparation of assigned portions of intelligence digests and such other data and visual presentation as may be requested.

(b) Psychological warfare operations are supplementary to and must be coordinated with military operations. To insure this, a Planning Group to act as a joint medium shall be set up in the Office of Strategic Services for



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MEMORANDUM
1943-1844

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supervising and coordinating the planning and execution of the military program for psychological warfare. The Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall consist of:

(1) One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two members appointed by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, two members appointed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and four members, including the Chairman, appointed by the Director of the Office of Strategic Services.

(2) The members of the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall be available for full-time duty and shall be free from other assigned duties.

(3) An advisory committee comprising representatives from the Board of Economic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Treasury Department, and from time to time representatives of such other Government agencies as may be called upon to serve, shall be set up to serve with the Planning Group either as individual members or as a committee when requested by the Chairman of the Group to consider matters affecting the respective agencies represented on the committee. Members of the Advisory Committee will advise the Planning Committee as to how their respective agencies can be of assistance in insuring the success of psychological warfare plans.

(4) All major projects and plans for psychological warfare will be integrated with military and naval programs by the Office of Strategic Services



AUTHORITY: MEMORANDUM FOR

Subject:

Chief, Office of Industrial Security
Contract Administration Services
Defense Supply Agency (13 Aug 73)
Hoover Institute Declassification Program

Reviewer:

EXM

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159-2
(J.C.S. 202/1/D)

DECLASSIFIED FEB 24 1977
(date of document) date

COPY NO. 10 of 13

159

(1) J.C.S. 202

January 20, 1943

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE

WAR PLANNING AGENCIES

(References: (a) J.C.S. 50th Meeting, Item 8;
(b) J.C.S. 202.)

By direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference (a)) the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the Secretariat Joint Chiefs of Staff hereby appoint a special committee to undertake a study of the charters and functions of all agencies within the cognizance and under the jurisdiction of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

This committee will examine the functioning of the war planning system as now constituted under the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and make such recommendations for its improvement as seem appropriate. The committee will consider J.C.S. 202, together with such recommendations as may be made by the supporting agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report of the committee will be submitted to the Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff to serve as a basis for recommendations by them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The committee is constituted as follows:

Captain Charles J. Moore, U.S.N.
(Representing the Vice Chief of Naval Operations)

Colonel Frank N. Roberts, G.S.C., U.S.A.
(Representing the Deputy Chief of Staff, U. S. Army)

Colonel Charles P. Cabell, A.C., U.S.A.
(Representing the Chief of Air Staff)

Commander L. R. McDowell, U.S.N.
(Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat)

Lieutenant C. F. Barber, U.S.N.R., Secretary.
(Non-member)



1943-1844

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(see back of document) date

January 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST:


1. Enclosed herewith is a directive to a special committee appointed to undertake a study of the war planning system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Each addressee is requested to furnish the Secretary of this special committee, (Room 222, C.C.S. Building) as soon as practicable and not later than January 30, a copy of its charter or terms of reference under which it is functioning, with comment as to its adequacy and recommendations for any changes deemed desirable.
3. In addition to the above, any further recommendations regarding the functions of other committees and their interrelation one to another, or any other suggestions for improvement of the war planning system, are invited.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

FORREST B. ROYAL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Deputy Secretary.

Distribution:

Joint Strategic Survey Committee
Joint Staff Planners
Joint Strategic Committee
Munitions Assignments Board
Joint Communications Board
Joint Intelligence Committee
Joint Military Transportation Committee
Joint Committee on New Weapons and Equipment
Joint Meteorological Committee
Army and Navy Petroleum Board
Office of Strategic Services



Hoover Institute
Defense Supply Agency (13 Aug 73)
Contract Administration Services
Chief, Office of Industrial Security

REVIEWED: 24M
Subject: MEMORANDUM FOR


OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
MEMORANDUM
1943-1944

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

21 August 1943

MEMORANDUM TO Colonel Goodfellow
FROM Captain Hoffmann
SUBJECT Attached envelope

1. We hasten to forward the attached envelope addressed to you.
2. We would very much appreciate the return of the report contained therein as soon as possible, since this office has been awaiting its arrival for quite some time.



CARL O. HOFFMANN
Captain, ABS

COH:EAK

February 8, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Miss Dockery
From: Francis T. Devlin
Subject: Contents of boxes received 1/25/43

1. The following material was received by me and will be added to shipments going into the field or used by this office:

- 2 canteens
- 1 button polising kit
- 8 Thermat - medium size refill heat units
- 1 can instant coffee
- 2 cans "Rig" - rust inhibiting grease
- 1 jar alum powder
- 1 rifle belt
- 1 leather belt
- 1 gun sling
- 1 box paper clips
- 1 half ramrod
- 1 pressure cooker "Home DE Luxe"
- 2 rolls friction tape
- 1 hot water bottle
- 1 fur
- 1 tent
- 2 boxes bouillon cubes "Steero"
- 1 mending kit
- 1 .32 cal. rod

Francis T. Devlin
Francis T. Devlin
Major, Inf.

4 maggio 1944

LA SITUAZIONE MILITARE ITALIANA

L'esame dell'attuale situazione militare italiana richiede, per una giusta valutazione di quanto si è finora fatto, un cenno sia pure sommario delle condizioni in cui l'Esercito si trovava all'atto dell'armistizio e nel periodo seguente.

Per quanto nel nostro caso la decisione di concludere l'armistizio con le Nazioni Unite sia stata dettata prevalentemente dal desiderio di tutto il Paese di por fine ad una guerra non desiderata, non sentita e contraria in definitiva ai supremi interessi nazionali, sarebbe tuttavia astrarre dalla realtà il non riconoscere che le nostre unità dell'Esercito e specie quelle poche della Penisola, erano nel settembre assai mal ridotte specialmente in fatto di armi e materiali.

Tre anni di guerra, con operazioni condotte in scacchieri oltre mare e lontani, avevano consumato tutte le nostre scarse risorse e le nostre deficienze erano compensate dalla Germania, i cui aiuti erano sempre forniti in ritardo e col contagocce e comunque sempre molto al di sotto delle necessità.

Un giornale inglese, nei giorni dell'armistizio, ha giustamente rilevato che, mentre la Germania il 25 luglio era divenuta automaticamente nemica dell'Italia, l'Inghilterra ed i suoi Alleati non avevano compreso che altrettanto automaticamente in quel momento l'Italia diveniva loro alleata potenziale.

Il periodo dal 25 luglio all'8 settembre è stato di una tragicità senza eguali per il nostro Paese posto di fronte agli evidenti preparativi germanici contro di noi (forse anche per riportare il fascismo al potere), al disordine interno provocato dalle agitazioni del popolo giustamente proteso verso la cessazione delle ostilità,



./.

ma non altrettanto conscio della sicura reazione tedesca e della necessità di predisporre i mezzi per fronteggiarla, alle perentorie richieste degli Alleati rigidamente fermi sul principio della "resa senza condizioni".

E' una situazione che dimostra chiaramente come, in seguito, la possibilità di attuazione delle clausole militari dell'armistizio fosse, più che in funzione della buona volontà italiana, in dipendenza della preordinata reazione tedesca largamente appoggiata a potenti mezzi fatti affluire tempestivamente nella Penisola.

Ciò nonostante la volontà italiana di battersi si palesò fin da quei primi giorni successivi all'armistizio in parecchi settori, come è dimostrato dai primi combattimenti attorno a Roma, dall'azione delle nostre Unità in Sardegna e Corsica per scacciare da quelle isole le unità germaniche, dalla disperata ed eroica resistenza dei presidi italiani delle isole Jonie (Cefalonia e Corfù), dalla successiva lotta sostenuta dalle unità della divisione "Cuneo" accanto a truppe inglesi, nelle isole dell'Egeo, dalla divisione "Pinerolo" in Grecia, dalle divisioni "Perugia" e "Firenze" in Albania, dalle divisioni "Marche", "Emilia", "Venezia" e "Taurinense" in Erzegovina, prov. di Cattaro e Montenegro ed infine dalla valida resistenza, tuttora in atto, opposta dalle unità italiane in Montenegro (div. "Garibaldi").

Governo ed Autorità Militari italiani rivolsero subito i loro sforzi per l'approntamento di unità destinate ad operare contro il comune nemico tedesco.

Ma ci si è qui urtati contro difficoltà che la sola buona volontà nostra era incapace di superare.

Per quanto le condizioni di armistizio fossero il naturale epilogo della sconfitta militare, esse risultarono, all'atto pratico, di una durezza eccessiva, perchè non tenevano alcun conto della necessità per l'Italia di essere agevolata nel suo desiderio di azione anti-tedesca. Tale necessità, in fondo, avrebbe coinciso con l'interesse militare alleato e appunto per questo si sperava sarebbe tenuta

presente con una applicazione mitigata delle clausole d'armistizio, anche se le necessità politiche alleate avevano imposto che queste fossero dure.

Viceversa non solo nulla ci fu dato, ma molto dello scarso armamento ed equipaggiamento italiano che era ancora disponibile nell'Italia liberata, venne inesorabilmente bloccato ed in gran parte utilizzato per altri servizi, e mentre nei magazzini della Sicilia esistevano notevoli quantità di oggetti di vestiario, i soldati italiani erano costretti ad andare stracciati e scalzi.

In Corsica le nostre unità, dopo che avevano contribuito notevolmente a cacciare i tedeschi dall'isola, furono costrette a rientrare in Sardegna lasciando alle Autorità Francesi armi, munizioni, quadrupedi, automezzi, materiali vari, ossia furono rese praticamente inefficienti.

Requisizioni vennero ad impoverire ulteriormente in tutti i campi enti civili e militari, popolazione e reparti.

Limitazioni di ogni genere furono poste alle nostre Autorità militari nell'esecuzione dei loro compiti.

Militari italiani vennero richiesti in gran numero, ma solo per essere impiegati come lavoratori e nei lavori più faticosi.-

La popolazione italiana, che ovunque aveva accolto gli Alleati come liberatori ebbe ben presto a subire molte delusioni e, pur apprezzando l'aiuto ricevuto nel campo dell'alimentazione, dovette con amarezza sopportare non poche violenze dovute a singoli elementi, nonché provvedimenti draconiani di requisizioni di fabbricati ed abitazioni che buttavano repentinamente sul lastrico numerose famiglie.

Ospedali, sanatori, collegi, scuole, ecc., furono da un giorno all'altro fatti sgombrare ed occupati.

Fabbriche e stabilimenti furono posti nell'impossibilità di produrre anche perchè tutte le poche materie prime disponibili vennero requisite e sfruttate ad uso esclusivo delle armate alleate.

Vandalismi ingiustificati hanno portato ad es. a bruciare per riscaldamento mobili preziosi e documenti, pubblici e privati,

di valore storico inestimabile.

La quasi totale requisizione degli automezzi, unitamente alle già avvenute distruzioni delle ferrovie, portarono alla paralisi dei trasporti.

La larga disponibilità di valuta dei militari alleati ed il cambio troppo favorevole (dollaro a 100 lire, sterlina a 400 lire) hanno sottratto le poche merci che ancora rimanevano in circolazione con conseguente impoverimento del mercato ed elevazione dei prezzi a cifre iperboliche.

Infine, l'amministrazione A.M.G.O.T., che pure ha acquistato tante benemerenze presso gli italiani nel lodevole scopo di eliminare gli insani principi di organizzazione fascista, poichè non sempre impose sistemi amministrativi adatti alla mentalità ed alle più vecchie tradizioni italiane, come non sempre ricorse agli elementi migliori per sostituire quelli vecchi e bacati, ha paralizzato spesso attività civili ed economiche delle regioni liberate. La cosa è aggravata dal fatto che è inibito alla autorità italiana, per le provincie ritornate alla sua sovranità, rimuovere anche quei funzionari che, nominati dagli alleati, danno prova di incapacità e talvolta anche di disonestà.

Le interferenze nel campo tanto delicato dell'amministrazione della giustizia militare e civile, hanno avuto gravi ripercussioni.

La conseguenza di tutto ciò non poteva portare che uno scaldamento generale del morale che ha dato luogo nel campo politico alla ben nota caotica situazione, effetto primo della perplessità e delle incognite dell'avvenire.

In tali condizioni era resa difficile ogni azione rivolta a riordinare efficacemente quanto era rimasto dell'Esercito italiano per costituirne unità efficienti.

Ciò nonostante, superando difficoltà di ogni genere e racimolando le briciole disponibili, le Autorità Militari italiane si misero all'opera e nel dicembre 1943 a soli tre mesi di distanza dal-

l'armistizio i primi battaglioni italiani già versavano il loro sangue a Monte Lungo a fianco delle truppe alleate.

Da allora altro cammino è stato fatto, sia pure lentamente e fra infinite difficoltà. Una divisione italiana è stata costituita - sempre però con sole armi e mezzi italiani, ben noti per inadeguatezza alle necessità della guerra moderna - e già combatte degnamente a fianco delle unità alleate. Recentemente le imprese di Monte Marrone e di Monte Castelnuovo sono state riconosciute dagli stessi Alleati.

Altri reparti sono già pronti e, non appena gli Alleati lo consentiranno ed effettueranno i necessari trasporti dalla Sardegna, potranno entrare in linea costituendo con quelli che già vi si trovano il Corpo Italiano di Liberazione, forte di 15 battaglioni e 8 gruppi d'artiglieria per un totale di oltre 20.000 uomini.

Inoltre un ingente contributo è stato dato dalle forze armate italiane per rispondere alle sempre crescenti richieste degli Alleati. Opera già infatti a loro favore un complesso di unità del genio, dei servizi e ausiliarie per una forza totale di oltre 100.000 uomini e nuove unità sono in approntamento per circa altri 100.000.

Molti di questi uomini sono caduti in combattimento lavorando per gli Alleati in primissima linea, non esclusa la testa di sbarco di Anzio.

Bisogna però avere il coraggio di riconoscere che la diffidenza e la sfiducia degli Alleati hanno fatto perdere un tempo prezioso.

Con un loro diverso atteggiamento iniziale, non una, ma più divisioni italiane avrebbero potuto essere oggi già in campo a fianco degli Alleati. E' bene tenere presente, a questo proposito, che il Comando Alleato ha imposto un limite alla nostra partecipazione nel campo operativo: la forza combattente non deve superare i 12.000 uomini.

Molto cammino resta ancora da percorrere per raggiungere

quella completa ed efficace collaborazione nel campo operativo che è nei desideri degli italiani di dare.

L'Esercito italiano ha la possibilità di collaborare attivamente con gli Alleati nelle operazioni di guerra molto più largamente di quanto ora avviene, purchè da parte alleata gli si venga incontro:

- permettendo che la forza combattente possa oltrepassare i 14.000 uomini; tale forza, per la quale non chiediamo armi agli Alleati, può essere portata subito a 20.000 uomini;
- facilitando l'azione di comando delle nostre Autorità Militari nel senso di lasciare loro libertà di azione nell'esecuzione dei programmi stabiliti in comune;
- fornendo quelle armi e materiali adatti di cui difettiamo per dotarne le nuove unità destinate a combattere.

L'Esercito italiano sarebbe in grado di preparare per l'impiego in combattimento, oltre il Corpo Italiano di Liberazione, sette od otto divisioni per le quali però dovrebbero essere forniti da parte anglo-americana: armi, mezzi di collegamento, mezzi automobilistici ed in parte vestiario ed equipaggiamento.

Nessuna difficoltà per l'addestramento di qualsiasi tipo di unità: i nostri quadri sono in grado di farlo con la dovuta capacità. Nessun ostacolo di carattere politico si opporrebbe all'aumento del nostro sforzo bellico; i soldati italiani sanno che combattendo servono esclusivamente la Patria nel quadro delle sue vecchie e tradizionali istituzioni.

Condizione necessaria per realizzare in pieno questo programma, sarebbe però che gli Alleati riducessero in parte le loro esigenze di unità per servizi ausiliari che, con le nuove richieste verrebbero ad assorbire oltre metà della forza dell'Esercito italiano, non lasciando quindi un margine sufficiente per la costituzione delle altre 8 divisioni e per le necessità dell'organizzazione militare territoriale.

Altra importante questione che occorrerebbe risolvere è quel=

la dei prigionieri di guerra: nonostante la posizione di cobelligeranza assunta dall'Italia, nulla è mutato nelle condizioni dei prigionieri. Cosa questa incomprensibile per le popolazioni e per i soldati italiani, specie quando si è giunti al punto di portare nuclei di prigionieri, sempre considerati come tali, a lavorare nelle provincie italiane liberate e si sono mantenuti prigionieri in Sicilia i militari delle regioni ancora occupate dai tedeschi, lasciando in libertà sulla parola i militari siciliani.

Aggiungasi a ciò l'inumano trattamento fatto ai prigionieri italiani in mano francese, senza che le autorità anglo-americane siano potute intervenire a far cessare un tale stato di cose provocato essenzialmente dal fatto che numerosissimi prigionieri catturati dalle unità anglo-americane furono ceduti ai francesi.

Per risolvere intanto le più urgenti questioni relative ai prigionieri occorrerebbe:

- definire il nuovo status dei prigionieri in relazione alla cobelligeranza ed al loro impiego per la più efficace collaborazione con gli Alleati, risolvendo nel contempo lo spinoso problema dei prigionieri italiani in mano francese;
- rimpatriare una aliquota di personale, necessario per completare e migliorare l'inquadramento dei reparti italiani in Patria.

E' bene inoltre tener presente che fra i prigionieri di guerra vi è tuttora un notevole numero dei nostri migliori comandanti e combattenti, collaudati da una lunga esperienza di guerra.

Se si entrasse nell'ordine di idee di armarli, equipaggiarli ed inquadrarli, si potrebbe con certezza fare assegnamento su un certo numero di unità pronte a combattere in terra italiana per la liberazione della Patria. Ma occorrerebbe far presto e non lasciar disperdere più oltre nei campi di concentramento le forze spirituali di questi valorosi e fedeli soldati.

Si incominci intanto a fare rimpatriare la divisione "Cuneo" (circa 8.000 uomini) che dopo di aver combattuto a fianco agli ingle-

si nelle isole dell'Egeo è stata concentrata in Palestina per lavori.

Si deve inoltre ricordare, all'infuori del contributo dell'Esercito, lo sforzo bellico che la Marina e l'Aeronautica stanno compiendo, già notevole di per sé e suscettibile di un ulteriore incremento.

La Marina italiana, superata rapidamente l'inevitabile crisi iniziale aggravata dalle dure perdite dovute alla predisposta reazione tedesca, ha ripreso fin dall'inizio le sue missioni di guerra accanto alle flotte alleate, svolgendo un lavoro tenace, silenzioso e prezioso che ha già ricevuto il giusto riconoscimento delle più alte autorità alleate. Ben maggiore sarebbe il contributo che potrebbe dare qualora potesse disporre di tutte le sue navi che invece ora stanno in parte inattive nei porti alleati.

L'Aeronautica raccogliendo nei distrutti e sconvolti campi reliquati di aerei, in uno sforzo eroico di piloti e specialisti, ha saputo mettere insieme circa 250 aerei - corrispondenti alla quasi totalità di quelli esistenti all'atto dell'armistizio - che fino dal settembre operano a fianco dell'aviazione alleata. Ad onta delle più assidue cure, vede però diminuire giornalmente, attraverso il logorio delle macchine e le inevitabili perdite, il numero degli aerei efficienti che non è possibile mantenere a numero per mancanza di mezzi; ed una notevole massa di piloti e specialisti desiderosi di battersi per la redenzione del Paese è obbligata a rimanere inattiva, mentre potrebbe venire utilmente sfruttata con mezzi alleati. Si può affermare che in base al personale disponibile, l'Aeronautica italiana potrebbe senza difficoltà impiegare alcune centinaia di aerei alleati.

Come si vede molto è stato fatto, specie se si tien conto degli scarsi mezzi a disposizione dell'Italia; ma molto di più è quello che rimane da fare e che potrà essere attuato, realizzando un più largo contributo nel campo operativo a favore della causa alleata.

Per fare questo però è necessario dare all'Italia un adeguato aiuto sia nel campo dei materiali (cioè in quel campo nel quale essa

è stata sempre notoriamente deficitaria), sia in quello morale della comprensione della sicura volontà di collaborare nella guerra contro i tedeschi da parte del popolo italiano, non ostante la sua difficile situazione.

Un primo e notevole passo su questa via sarebbe indubbiamente fatto qualora si addivenisse ad una radicale revisione delle durissime clausole dell'armistizio, che liberando l'Italia dai vincoli eccessivi tuttora imposti, le ridonasse - sempre assistita dall'aiuto anglo-americano-russo - la sua piena capacità giuridica e politica e la completa sovranità ed indipendenza interna. Così facendo sarebbe consentito all'Italia di esplicare realmente nel campo dello sforzo bellico, la funzione più che di cobelligerante, di vera e propria alleata.

E' evidente che tutto ciò, anche in vista dell'asprezza e durata del conflitto, rappresenta un comune interesse per le Nazioni Unite e per l'Italia stessa.-

M.P. GOODFELLOW

SUBJECT FILE

PSYCHOLÓGICAL
WATERPARK

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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington

August 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
AIDE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET
SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF PLANNERS
SECRETARY, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMM.

In their 29th meeting, held on August 18th, the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff considered J.C.S. 83, "FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES - ORGANIZED SABOTAGE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE."

After discussion, the Chiefs of Staff:

- (a) Approved the recommendations of the Joint U. S. Staff Planners as listed on page 6 of basic paper.
- (b) Agreed to the substitution of the word "through" for the word "by" in the penultimate line of paragraph C (1) on page 5.

There is enclosed for your convenience a copy of J.C.S. 83/1, which is J.C.S. 83 as amended in the meeting.

For Brig. Gen. W. B. Smith

J. C. HOLMES
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Secy.

Enclosure



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DECLASSIFIED

FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

J. C. S. 83/1

AUGUST 19, 1942

JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -

ORGANIZED SABOTAGE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

(Previous Reference: J.C.S. 29th Meeting, Item 5)

Note by the Secretaries

J.C.S. 83, approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, subject to an amendment, is circulated herewith as finally accepted.

W. B. SMITH,

L. R. McDOWELL,

Joint Secretariat.



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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

ENCLOSURE

FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -
ORGANIZED SABOTAGE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. Pursuant to the Directive from the Chief of Staff, United States Army, dated July 14, 1942 (J.F.W.C. 21/D), the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has investigated the subjects listed therein and makes the following report:

A. NATURE OF OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

(1) Organized Sabotage and Guerilla Warfare.

(a) Organized Sabotage. Conduct of organized sabotage in areas occupied by the enemy has become an important if not an essential mode of warfare.

Usually a representative, called an organizer (either a native or a person knowing the language of the country into which he is sent, and trained in the use of radio) enters a designated area to do, among other things, any or all of the following:

- (1) To organize and to incite to action



native groups in enemy occupied territory.

(ii) To arrange for the entry of arms and equipment for these groups.

(iii) To distribute seditious pamphlets.

(iv) To give instruction in the character and use of demolition material.

(v) To direct, supervise or to conduct sabotage activities.

(vi) To set up "reception committees" to meet and to aid our armed forces.

All this is done as a means of preparing an area for offensive operations by our armed forces. Instruction in this method of warfare has been undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services and in certain areas (either alone or in conjunction with the British) operations are now being carried on.

(b) Guerilla Warfare. Guerilla units should be made up in whole or in part of individuals of foreign birth or foreign descent who are already in the armed forces and have had at least three months training. These units, composed of personnel of tested loyalty to the United States,



should be organized into language guerilla groups, and should be made available to theater commanders conducting operations in countries to which such groups are native. It is conceived that these units, trained and conditioned for such service, could be employed by the theater commander.

(i) Either by being part of his invading wave, or

(ii) by being placed behind the enemy lines through parachute or glider to joint up with the "reception committees" already organized among the native population.

These guerilla groups should be centralized and specially trained with full advantage taken of their knowledge of the language and acquaintance with the various countries, and assigned as needed to various theater commanders, could be made an effective auxiliary force.

(2) Type of Training.

(a) Organized Sabotage. As carried on by the Office of Strategic Services saboteur candidates are put through a seven-week course which



embraces preliminary, basic, and advanced training. Special courses for certain type operations, such as industrial, railroad, and communications sabotage are also given. The subjects of instruction for these courses have been planned in advance and are given by officers who themselves have been through schools of instruction in these subjects. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has questioned the Office of Strategic Services officers in charge of the training, and certain members of that Subcommittee have observed the operations of one camp, including the work given in the preliminary and basic schedules. It has compared this training with the accounts of British training and with the report of the training in Germany given to the saboteurs now on trial before the Military Commission. From these reports and this observance, it is believed that the type of training being given is suitable for saboteurs and for the "organizers" of saboteurs.

(b) Guerilla Warfare. It is proposed that the training of guerilla units will include train-



ing in demolition and in the preparation of demolition material. Emphasis will be placed upon physical conditioning. Attention will be given to scouting and patrolling, to instruction in the infantry weapons and, since the guerilla company is completely free of administrative and supply units, it will be trained to fend for itself and live off the country.

(3) Type of Individual to be Trained.

(a) Organized Sabotage. Individuals have been recruited by the Office of Strategic Services from men sent by the Army or Navy, from foreigners who have been living in this country and also from members of Allied armies in England recruited by the British S.O.E.

(b) Guerilla Warfare. Personnel for guerilla units is to be recruited from foreign nationals in the United States Army who volunteer for service and who meet the necessary physical and mental requirements for such work.

(4) Training as Individual Saboteurs or Guerilla Warfare Units or Both

Statements have been received as to the desired



use of both individual saboteurs and guerilla warfare units. It is apparent that the services of these two agencies are complementary to each other, and that both can be used under the direction of theater commanders to good advantage, saboteurs as immediate and continued agents of attrition, and guerilla units behind enemy lines on special missions assigned by the theater commander to synchronize with his offensive or with the first attacking waves. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee believes that training by the Office of Strategic Services in both types of subversive warfare is desirable.

(5) Method of Allocating Graduates from Schools.

Officers experienced in sabotage training have already been sent to several areas, with the consent or at the request of theater commanders. It is planned to allocate militarized guerilla units to theaters of operation to implement basic directives from the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff or in accordance with requests from theater commanders, and to have these units operate solely under the direction of such commanders.



B. ARMY AND NAVY INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL FOR SCHOOLS.

The type of training given makes it apparent that Army and Navy personnel are needed for instructional purposes both in the military field and in the technical field. Approval of the recent request for 416 more Army grades and ratings will meet the immediate emergency, but should the organization of militarized guerilla units be authorized, additional increments of army and Navy instructors will be needed, dependent upon the exigencies of the demand.

C. CONTROL OF SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS.

(1) In theaters of operations.

In theaters of operation, or in operational areas of task forces, officers, agents and functions of the Office of Strategic Services will be under the direct control of theater or task force commanders and will comply with the provisions of J.C.S. 67/3, except when the theater commander is an officer of another nation. In this case direct control will be exercised through the senior American commander if such exists, otherwise as directed by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

(2) In areas outside of theaters of operations.

When operating outside a theater of operations,



officers, agents, and functions of the Office of Strategic Services will be under the control of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through such officer or agency as may be designated by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

D. LIAISON.

(1) Theaters of Operations.

In theaters of operation, liaison between the Office of Strategic Services and other agencies, either foreign or United States, will be as directed by the officer or agency exercising control of Office of Strategic Services officers, agents, and functions.

(2) In areas outside of a theater of military operations.

Plans for subversive operations to be conducted in areas outside theaters of military operations must be approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff will exercise general control over such operations and will delegate direct control to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services or such other officer or agency as they may designate.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS.

A. That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff accept in principle the functions of the Office of Strategic Services as indicated herein; further study will be made by the Joint



Psychological Warfare Committee as to training, type of men used and organization, and that committee will make further recommendations to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

B. That in the meantime the present system of the Office of Strategic Services in the training and use of saboteurs be continued, with such necessary changes as will meet progressive standards; and that the method of allocating saboteurs, viz., assignment by direction of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff or at the request of theater commanders through the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, remain in force.

C. That decisions as to establishment, organization, training and use of guerilla units await the study and report recommended in paragraph 2-A above.

D. That the Army and Navy furnish instructor personnel for these schools in the numbers authorized by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with tables of organization to be submitted for approval later.

E. That control of subversive operations, including guerilla warfare units, be in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 D.

F. That liaison between the Office of Strategic Services and other agencies be in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 D.





Psychological Warfare Committee as to training, type of
man used and organization, and that committee will make
further recommendations to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of

Staff.
B. That in the meantime the present system of the
Office of Strategic Services in the training and use of
associates be continued, with such necessary changes as
will meet progressive standards; and that the method of
allocating associates, viz., assignment by direction of
the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff or at the request of
theater commanders through the Joint U. S. Chiefs of
Staff, remain in force.

C. That decisions as to establishment, organization,
training and use of guerrilla units await the study and re-
port recommended in paragraph B-A above.
D. That the Army and Navy furnish instructor person-

nel to these schools in the numbers authorized by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with copies of
the plan submitted for approval later.

E. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1 D.
F. That liaison between the Office of Strategic
Services and other agencies be in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph 1 D.

MEMORANDUM FOR
AUTHORITY:

Subject:

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Reviewer:

Office of Industrial Security
Contract Administration Service
Defense Supply Agency (13 Aug
Hoover Institute Declassification Program



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FEB 24 1977

J.C.S. 12

FEBRUARY 13, 1942.

OCS 385 (2-14-42)

COPY NO. 62



JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure is presented by the Joint U.S. Staff Planners for consideration by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

L. R. McDOWELL.

ENCLOSURE

1. The proposals in this paper are intended to implement the directive on subversive activities and propaganda as contained in the American-British Grand Strategy, approved by the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff on December 31, 1941. This grand strategy provides that subversive activity and propaganda will be employed in wearing down and undermining Axis resistance.
2. The scope of activities which includes "subversive activities" and "propaganda", referred to in this paper as psychological warfare, is understood to include all forms of activity and operations, outside of organized military action, calculated to cause a deterioration of the enemy's morale and military effectiveness, or to improve the morale and position of non-belligerent countries towards the United Nations.
3. There are three classes of areas in which psychological warfare can be effective. First, those areas designated as theaters of operations; second, those enemy-controlled areas not included in theaters or operations; and third, non-belligerent areas. For the purpose of indicating strategic responsibility, areas are further classified as those in which the United States



M.P. GOODFELLOW

SUBJECT FILE

PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE

has sole responsibility, those in which Great Britain has sole responsibility, and those where the United States and Great Britain, and in appropriate cases other nations, have joint or common interest.

4. It should be recognized that the fundamental purpose of psychological warfare is to supplement military warfare in such a manner as to contribute to ultimate military success. Acceptance of this fundamental leads to the conclusion that the integration of psychological warfare with military strategy can only be accomplished when direction is given by the military command.

5. The implementation of psychological warfare consists of a planning phase and an operating phase. In each phase the activities of interested agencies will be coordinated to accomplish the military objective.

6. Directives for psychological warfare in active theaters of operation will be included in basic strategical plans. Plans for psychological warfare in other areas will be harmonized with strategical objectives approved by the Joint and/or Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. Basic strategic planning of psychological warfare must also take cognizance of the interests and facilities of other co-belligerents.

7. The departments of the United States Government directly responsible for basic strategic planning of operations for the conduct of war are the War and Navy Departments. Agencies of the government involved in the implementation of psychological warfare plans are the State, War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice, the Coordinator of Information, the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Board of Economic Warfare.

8. Actual drafting of psychological warfare directives for the areas designated as theaters of operations and those enemy controlled areas not included in theaters of operations will be

done by a sub-committee organized for this purpose under the direction of the Joint Staff Planners.

9. The execution of psychological warfare in a theater of operations is a function of command. This requires that no agency be permitted to direct, operate or execute psychological warfare within an organized theater independent of the commander thereof. The personnel and facilities of all government agencies should be employed to the fullest extent under control and direction of the theater commander.

10. The execution of psychological warfare in enemy controlled areas not included in theaters of operations and in non-belligerent areas will be conducted by the appropriate existing agency of the government organized to carry out these duties as already established by executive orders dated July 11, 1941, and July 30, 1941.

11. In order to accomplish basic planning to establish control in the execution of plans, to serve and assist theater commanders in the execution of these plans, and to serve as the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative in contact with all other government agencies involved in psychological warfare, there will be established a joint War and Navy Department agency charged with these duties. This agency should be a part of or be set up within that section of the existing War or Navy Departments organizations whose present functions best lend themselves to developing the specific activities to be assigned the agency.

Recommendations.

In order to implement the directive on subversive activities and propaganda as laid down by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the American-British grand strategy the following is recommended:

1. That the principles set forth above for the conduct of psychological warfare and its integration with military strategy be accepted.

2. That a sub-committee of the Joint Staff planners, composed of two members of the Joint Strategic Committee, two members of the G-2 Division, War Department General Staff, and two members of the Division of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, shall be constituted as the Psychological Warfare Committee.

3. That the functions of the Psychological Warfare Committee shall be:

a. In conjunction with subordinate agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and the State Department or other existing government agencies, to initiate, formulate and develop plans for Psychological Warfare.

b. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to coordinate psychological warfare of other U. S. governmental agencies and to collaborate with interested nations to the end that all psychological warfare is in accord with approved strategy.

c. As an agency of the War and Navy Departments to be responsible under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee that psychological warfare is integrated with military strategy.

Chief, Office of Industrial Security
Contract Administration Support
Defense Supply Agency (15 Aug 1964)
Hoover Institute Declassification Program

Defense Supply Agency (13 Aug

Hoover Institute Declassification Program

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington

August 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
SECRETARY, JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMM.
SECRETARY, JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SECRETARY, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
AIDE TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. FLEET


In their 28th meeting, held on August 11th, the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff approved J.C.S. 67/3, "DIRECTIVE FOR OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES," with one amendment: in the last line of paragraph six, after the word and, the expression /or is to be inserted.

A corrected copy of J.C.S. 67/3 is enclosed for your convenience.

For Brig. Gen. W. B. Smith:

J. C. HOLMES
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Secy.

Enclosures



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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

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J.C.S. 67/3

August 8, 1942

JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE FOR

OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
(Previous reference: J.C.S. 27th Meeting, Item 1)

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a redraft of J.C.S. 67/2, has been prepared in accordance with the above reference and is submitted for consideration by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

W. B. SMITH,

L. R. McDOWELL,

Joint Secretariat.



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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

ENCLOSURE

JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

DIRECTIVE FOR
OPERATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1. So much of this directive to the Office of Strategic Services as is in conflict with J.C.S. 67 and J.C.S. 68 will supersede those papers.
2. The normal channel of communication from the Office of Strategic Services to military or other government or foreign agencies will be through the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, except on purely intelligence matters, when it will be through the Joint U. S. Intelligence Committee.
3. All plans for projects to be undertaken by the Office of Strategic Services will be submitted to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for approval. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee will refer such papers as it deems necessary



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(see back of document) date

to the Joint U. S. Staff Planners prior to submission to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee will take final action on all internal administrative plans pertaining to the Office of Strategic Services which do not involve military or naval personnel or military or naval equipment.

4. No commitments will be made to foreign governments or agencies on special plans or projects prior to approval of such plans or projects by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

5. Continuous direct liaison will be maintained by the Office of Strategic Services with military or other government agencies involved in the execution of approved plans or projects.

6. In theaters of operations, or in operational areas of task forces, officers or agents of the O.S.S. will be under the direct control of theater or task force commanders. They will keep the theater or task force commander informed of all plans or projects to be carried out within the theater, and their current status. They will



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not engage in any activity in a theater of operations which has not been approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and/or the theater commander.


7. A monthly report of the status of all current projects will be circulated by the Director, Office of Strategic Services, to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

Chief, Office of Industrial Security
Contract Administration Division
Defense Supply Agency (DASA)
Hoover Institute Declassification Program

MEMORANDUM FOR

Subject:

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not engage in any activity in a theater of operations which has not been approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff and/or the theater commander.

7. A monthly report of the status of all current projects will be circulated by the Director, Office of Strategic Services, to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

4. No commitments will be made to foreign governments or agencies on special plans or projects prior to approval of such plans or projects by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

5. Continuous direct liaison will be maintained by the Office of Strategic Services with military or other government agencies involved in the execution of approved plans or projects.

6. In theaters of operations, or in operations, the U. S. will

AUTHORITY: MEMORANDUM FOR
Subject: Chief, Office of Industrial Security
Contract Administration Service
Defense Supply Agency
Hoover Institute Declassification Program

Reviewer: ENM

7. The informed of all plans or projects to be carried out within the theater, and their current status. They will

file
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Colonel P. G. Black

Colonel O. Solbert

Colonel W. P. Scobey


Captain H. J. Redfield, U. S. N.

Lt. Commander A. Macomb

Lt. Commander Charles Moran

Lt. Colonel A. H. Outhank (Secretary, not a member)

(information from Colonel Holm's office
- Ext. 71872)



TS OF STAFF

February 25, 1942

referred to the Joint
bruary 13th in connection
s of various nationalities
trained for subversive
eeping with our general
no objection on the part
erations of the type contemplated
ological Warfare Committee
a supporting activity to

esses I suggest that the
responsible for carrying it into execution maintain
liaison with the Psychological Warfare Committee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. T. STARK
Admiral, U.S.Navy



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G.C.M.

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FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

February 25, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

General Marshall has referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff your letter of February 13th in connection with the recruiting of individuals of various nationalities to be sent to British schools and trained for subversive activities. The proposal is in keeping with our general plan of war strategy and there is no objection on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Operations of the type contemplated will be coordinated by the Psychological Warfare Committee now in process of organization as a supporting activity to the joint Chiefs of Staff.

As your program progresses I suggest that the officials responsible for carrying it into execution maintain liaison with the Psychological Warfare Committee.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) H. T. STARK
Admiral, U.S.Navy



OK
G.C.M.

DECLASSIFIED

FEB 24 1977

(see back of document) date

~~SECRET~~

C
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February 13, 1942

General George C. Marshall,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall:

The British have asked us to recruit 900 Greeks, 450 Yugoslavs, 200 Hungarians, 200 Roumanians, 200 Bulgarians, and as many Poles as we can get.

These men are to be sent, under American leadership, to the British Schools in the Near East to be trained for subversive activities. There is a great need for wireless telegraph operators among these groups.

You may wish to take this matter up with the Joint Allied War Staff and let me know whether it is in keeping with the larger war strategy. This organization shall proceed with the recruiting immediately we receive word that this conforms with your strategy.

These men would be paid by this organization, their leaders chosen by us, and they would be assigned to their respective tasks as America's obligation in the joint effort.

The men, after training, would be available, in addition to their specific assignments, for any work the Army desired performed in the countries in which they will operate.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Goodfellow:Foy
CC- Miss Dockery



What we should like is a constant flow of recruits starting January 1st, 1942 and aimed at the following totals by mid-August :-

- (a) Greeks 900, of which 600 are guerillas.
- (b) Yugoslavs 450.
- (c) Poles - all we can get with the one following qualification essential - either German speakers suitable for Fifth Column work or with knowledge of the Balkan countries plus Hungary, or able to pass in those countries as a neutral.

The above should include a considerable proportion of W/T operators or men available for training as such. All would have to be men of brain as well as courage and ready to undertake sabotage, guerilla warfare or other subversive activities.

There is also an obvious difficulty in obtaining Hungarians, Roumanians, and Bulgarians, of which we should like to recruit 200 of each between January 1st and August 31st. Can anything be done to get these for the Middle East from America?

Specialised training, especially of W/T operators, is essential and takes time.



M.F. COWELL

SUBJECT FILE

U.S. WORK DEPARTMENT

SO. 4338 7
x Foreign nationals
x War Dept

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

WD 320.2 (3-17-42)MC-SP

MAR 25 1942

~~SECRET~~

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

In connection with your request for the appointment of certain aliens and foreign nationals as commissioned officers in the Army of the United States, for duty with the Coordinator of Information's Service Command, I am pleased to report the War Department's approval of your proposal.

It is contemplated that persons to be commissioned, having been inducted into the Army of the United States as enlisted men, will have completed basic military training and such special training as you prescribe, prior to being recommended by you for commissioned rank. They will then be commissioned in the grade of second lieutenant in the Army of the United States.

These lieutenants may, of course, be promptly promoted upon your recommendation to appropriate grades not higher than Major, commensurate with the tasks for which they are selected.

It is suggested that you submit a request for the desired initial allotment of such alien officers.

We understand that in the event legislation does not permit paying such officers while serving within the United States, funds available to you will be used for the purpose.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.



~~SECRET~~

M.P. GODFREY

SUBJECT FILE

*Capt 1st Lt
Please return*

F. B. Q.
MAPLE AVENUE
BELLMORE, L. I.
NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

AUGUST 26, 1942

MAJOR LAWRENCE W. LOWMAN,
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES,
25TH & E STS., N.W.,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR MAJOR LOWMAN:-

THE MANUSCRIPT OF "WORLD SHORTWAVE TRANSMISSIONS", PLUS AN ACCOMPANYING LETTER MISS KUNTZ ASKED ME TO WRITE, WILL EITHER BE IN YOUR HANDS ALREADY, OR ELSE REACH YOU SHORTLY. AFTER FURTHER DELIBERATION I DECIDED TO ADD THE FOLLOWING FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

SOME TIME AGO LT. COLONEL GROMBACH CALLED ME AT MY HOME TO EXPRESS HIS EXTREME ANNOYANCE (TO PUT IT MILDLY) AT MY NOT HAVING SENT THE MANUSCRIPT TO HIM IN WASHINGTON. I SHALL SPARE YOU THE DETAILS OF A HIGHLY DISTASTEFUL CONVERSATION, EXCEPT TO SAY THAT I TRIED TO EXPLAIN MY POSITION TO HIM ---- UTTERLY WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS AT ISSUE WERE:

- 1) WHO HOLDS THE MOST LEGITIMATE CLAIM TO THE WORK;
- 2) WHO IS TO RECEIVE THE CREDIT FOR IT.

INCIDENTALLY, OF COURSE, I WAS TOLD THAT, WHEREAS HE WOULD HAVE SEEN TO IT THAT I RECEIVED FULL CREDIT FOR MY WORK, I HAD NOW IRREDEMIABLY FORFEITED ALL MY CHANCES AS A RESULT OF MY INSISTENCE UPON TURNING THE WORK OVER TO YOU. SINCE IT WOULD BE A WASTE OF YOUR TIME AND MINE TO GO INTO THESE POINTS, I SHALL MERELY PRESENT THE FACTS. THEY WILL SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES, AND AT THE SAME TIME FURNISH YOU WITH THE NECESSARY BASIS UPON WHICH TO MAKE A DECISION.

IN RELATION TO POINT 1, THE ENTIRE MATERIAL WAS COLLECTED BY MYSELF FROM THE END OF 1939 TILL THE BEGINNING OF 1942, PARTLY WITH THE FACILITIES OF THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY DURING THE TIME I WAS DIRECTOR OF THEIR SHORTWAVE LISTENING POST HERE IN BELLMORE, AND PARTLY WITH THE FACILITIES OF MY OWN PRIVATE LISTENING POST, WHICH I OPERATED FOR SOME TIME AT HOLLIS, LONG ISLAND.

WHEN LT. COLONEL GROMBACH TOOK OVER THE LISTENING POST I SHOWED HIM ALL MY MATERIAL, WHEREUPON HE SUGGESTED THE PUBLICATION OF IT. THE WORK WAS GIVEN TO MISS LATIMER FOR COLLATING AND TYPING, BUT WAS TURNED BACK TO ME WHEN IT WAS FOUND THAT SHE WAS UNABLE TO CARRY IT THROUGH. I THEN DID ALL THE WORK MYSELF.

VER INSTITUTION ARCHIV

MILLARD P. GOODFELLOW

BOX NO. 5

ACCESSION NO. 69085-8.37